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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court held in Valentine v.
Chrestensen' that commercial speech did not fall under the protective
umbrella of the first amendment to the Constitution. The case in-
volved the distribution of handbills which advertised tours on a re-
tired United States Navy submarine. Distribution of the handbills
violated the city's sanitation code. To circumvent the operation of
the city code, the distributor printed public interest information on
the back of the handbills. However, the Court said that the com-
mercial message printed on one side of the handbills could not ac-
quire Constitutional protection by virtue of the public information
printed on the other side. 2
Accordingly, attorney advertising fell within the category of com-
mercial speech and was not entitled to protection under the first
and fourteenth amendments. Furthermore, at that time it was con-
sidered unethical for an attorney to solicit business by way of com-
mercial advertising, and courts throughout the country consistently
reaffirmed this restrictive view of attorneys' rights to exercise free
speech. 3 In fact, one court in Massachusetts asserted that "attorneys
at law practice a profession; they do not conduct a trade. It is
1. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. Id. at 55.
3. See People v. McCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 32 P. 280 (1893); State v. Hatcher, 201 Mass. 484,
87 N.E. 905 (1949).
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incompatible with the maintenance of correct professional standards
to employ commercial methods of attracting patronage." ' 4
Nine years later, in Breard v. Alexandria,5 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this restrictive view towards first amendment protection
of commercial speech. These court decisions were further solidified
in 1969 when the ABA adopted the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, which banned attorney advertising outright. The ABA con-
tended that such a restriction was in the public's best interest.6
The Supreme Court did not retreat from its traditional view of
denying first amendment protection to commercial speech until the
landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.7 Since Bates
and its successors have all been decided on an ad hoc basis, it has
taken a little over a decade for the Supreme Court to map out the
boundaries of its newer, more permissive approach toward attorney
advertising. Recently, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,8 the
Court further defined acceptable attorney advertising by holding that
a lawyer may solicit business by "sending truthful and non-deceptive
letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems." 9
This note will trace the eleven year history of the revolutionary
change in the Court's stand on attorney advertising, beginning with
Bates and ending with a discussion of the Shapero decision. As will
be seen, there has been an about face. The very abuses that the
court has been attempting to prevent, invasion of privacy, fraud,
undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of
"vexatious conduct,"' 0 are now more likely to occur and will be
more difficult to prevent.
4. In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 487-88, 159 N.E. 495, 497 (1928).
5. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
6. MODEL CODE OF PROs ssIoNAL RaspoNsmiarry EC 2-9, DR 2-101 (1969); for discussion see
Bowers & Stephens, Attorney Advertising and the First Amendment: The Development and Inpact
of a Constitutional Standard, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. Rav. 221, 232 (1987).
7. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
8. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1-16 (1988).
9. Id.
10. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); see also Wallace McKelvey,
Regulating Attorney Advertising, 18 TEx. TECH L. REv. 761, 765 (1987).
[Vol. 91
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II. BATES TO ZAUDERER
"[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed, and . .. the best means to that end is to open the channels of com-
munication, rather than to close them ....
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona12 the Supreme Court afforded
constitutional protection to attorney advertising for the first time.
The road to this landmark decision had been paved a year earlier
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,13 where the Court held that commercial speech is not wholly
outside the protection of the first amendment and that consumers
and society in general have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information.1 4 However, the Court noted that its de-
cision was limited to the pharmaceutical profession and the case at
bar and that it would not be applicable to attorneys since they pro-
vide "services of an infinite variety and nature" as opposed to phar-
macists who provide standardized products.1 5 Nevertheless, only a
year later the Court was again forced to address the issue as applied
to the legal profession in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.16
Bates involved two young attorneys who had opened a legal clinic
in which they performed standard legal services such as uncontested
divorces, simple adoptions, name changes and simple personal bank-
ruptcies.7 Since the attorneys enjoyed a relatively low return on their
services, they relied on substantial volume to maintain a viable prac-
tice. Therefore, in order to attract the volume of clients needed,
they placed an advertisement in a daily newspaper which listed the
services offered by the clinic and the fees charged for those services.18
A complaint was filed by the President of the State Bar, and, sub-
sequently, a hearing was held before a three member Special Local
11. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (quoting
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
12. Bates, 433 U.S. 350.
13. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 773 n.25.
16. Bates, 433 U.S. 350.
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Administrative Committee. 19 The two attorneys conceded that the
advertisement was a clear violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-101(b),
incorporated as Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona.20 How-
ever, they claimed, inter alia, that the rule infringed upon their first
amendment rights.21 The Administrative Committee could not ad-
dress the question of validity, and, consequently, the issue went
through the appropriate channels to the Arizona Supreme Court
which held that the disciplinary rule "passed First Amendment mus-
ter."' 22 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion, granted certiorari, and affirmed the decision in part and reversed
it in part.23 In its opinion, the Court reiterated its reasoning and
holding in Virginia Pharmacy Board and made it clear that its hold-
ing in Bates was narrow in scope.24 The issue in Bates concerned
advertising prices for certain routine services, and the court confined
its decision to that issue. Furthermore, the issues of in-person so-
licitation, extravagant claims as to quality of service, and basic fac-
tual content of advertisements were not at issue and, thus, were not
addressed.25
In its opinion, the Arizona court had asserted six justifications
for restricting the scope of permissible attorney advertising. Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court easily refuted each one: the misleading
nature of such advertising, the effect on the administration of jus-
tice, economic effects, the effect on the quality of service, the dif-
19. Id. at 356.
20. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) incorporated as Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona
provided that
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements,
radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories
or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so
in his behalf. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Rule 29(a), 17A Aiz. Rav. STAT., p. 26 (Supp. 1976).
Id. at 355.
21. Id. at 356. However, the attorneys also asserted that the rule violated sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act because of its tendency to restrain competition. The United States Supreme Court
held the rule did not violate the Act, distinguishing Bates from Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976). Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-62.
22. Bates, 433 U.S. at 358.
23. Id. at 350. The Supreme Court agreed with the Arizona court's holding with respect to
the Sherman Act but reversed the decision regarding the first amendment issue.
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ficulties of enforcement, and the adverse effect on professionalism.
The Court asserted that true professionalism would not be damaged
by advertising legal fees and that the idea that lawyers are "somehow
above trade" was an antiquated one.26 In holding that states may
not place blanket bans on attorney advertising, the Bates Court nev-
ertheless recognized that there were "clearly permissible limitations
not foreclosed by [its] holding." 27 For instance, any advertising that
is false, misleading or deceptive would be subject to restraint. Fur-
thermore, advertising regarding illegal transactions would obviously
be subject to suppression. Lastly, time, place and manner of the
advertisement as well as advertisements on electronic broadcast me-
dia may warrant some type of regulation. 28
Thus the constitutional door was opened to attorney advertising.
Nevertheless, many questions were left unanswered. In May 1978,
the Court had occasion to address one of the issues left undecided
by Bates when it was confronted with the question of in-person
solicitation in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.29 and In re Primus.30
Ohralik involved an Ohio lawyer who approached two eighteen-year-
old girls who had suffered injuries in an automobile accident. 31 The
lawyer made repeated visits to the girls and their parents to discuss
the possibilities of representing the girls in a suit. One girl finally
signed a contract, and the other gave oral assent.32 Later, both girls
asked to be released from their agreements. 33 However, the attorney
would not cooperate. Eventually, both girls filed complaints with
the County Bar Association which referred the grievances to the
Ohio State Bar Association. A formal complaint was then filed with
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court of Ohio.34 The Board did not agree with the attor-
26. Id. at 371-72. Addressing the issue of adverse effects on professionalism, the Court said:
"At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and their clients
the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar." Id.
27. Id. at 383.
28. Id. at 384.
29. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447.
30. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
31. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449-52.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 452 nn.5 & 6.
34. Id. at 452. For a discussion of Ohio disciplinary rules, see id. at 453 n.9.
19891
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ney's contention that his conduct was constitutionally protected. 5
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Board's decision,36 and
the United States Supreme Court followed suit.37
The United States Supreme Court noted that the advertising in
Ohralik differed from that in Bates "as [did] the strength of the
State's countervailing interest in prohibition. '"38 Discussing the dif-
ferences between the two cases, the Court said that:
Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the
recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and
often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for com-
parison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to
provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed
decisionmaking; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by
agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited in-
dividual.19
In fact, the Court noted that in-person solicitation "actually may
disserve the individual and societal interest, identified in Bates, in
facilitating 'informed and reliable decisionmaking.' "40 A critical fact
in Ohralik was that the in-person solicitation was made for pecuniary
gain. 41 Clearly, the Court intended to stand firm in its position of
preserving the honor and reputation of the. legal profession and pro-
tecting the public from the harmful effects of in-person solicitation,
including a "lawyer's exercise of judgment on behalf of the client
[which would] be clouded by his own pecuniary self-interest. ' 42
Ironically, the Court decided two in-person solicitation cases that
day, the other being In re Primus,43 where the Court reached a
conclusion different than that in Ohralik.44 Consequently, the Court
was able to further define the parameters of acceptable in-person
solicitation.
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 454.
38. Id. at 455.
39. Id. at 457.
40. Id. at 458.
41. Id. at 461, 470 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 461.
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Primus involved a South Carolina lawyer who was working with
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).45 The attorney sent a
letter to a woman advising her that the ACLU would provide free
legal assistance if she wished to seek redress for having been ster-
ilized after receiving public medical treatment. 46 Consequently, for-
mal complaints were filed charging the attorney with ethical
violations.47 The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the at-
torney had in fact violated certain disciplinary rules. 41 On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina court's decision.4 9
In short, the Court decided that
Appellant's letter of August 30, 1973 to Mrs. Williams thus comes within the
generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms.
The ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and
association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.1
Furthermore, the attorney's own pecuniary gain was not a motive
for the solicitation. The ACLU is a non-profit organization, and
any fees that the court might award would have been the organi-
zation's only compensation." Indeed, Justice Marshall in his con-
currence distinguished Ohralik:
The facts in Primus, by contrast, show a "solicitation" of employment in ac-
cordance with the highest standards of the legal profession. Appellant in this case
was acting, not for her own pecuniary benefit, but to promote what she perceived
to be the legal rights of persons not likely to appreciate or to be able to vindicate
their own rights. The obligation of all lawyers, whether or not members of an
association committed to a particular point of view, to see that legal aid is avail-
able "where the litigant is in need of assistance, or where important issues are
involved in the case," has long been established.5 2
As will be seen, this distinction was muddled somewhat in Shapero.5 3
45. Id. at 415.
46. Id. at 416.
47. Id. at 417. For a discussion of the disciplinary rules in question, see id. at 418 n.10, 420
nn.1l & 12.
48. Id. at 421.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 431.
51. Id. at 430.
52. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring).
53. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. 1916.
19891
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Two years later, in 1980, the Court handed down its decision in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York. 54 Although the case did not involve attorney adver-
tising,55 Central Hudson is significant in that the Court set forth a
four prong test to be applied in commercial speech cases, 56 a test
which the Court has since consistently applied.5 7 Central Hudson
concerned New York State electric utility companies who had been
ordered to "cease all advertising that 'promot[es] the use of elec-
tricity.' "58 The Public Service Commission contended that the ban
was justified because of a prevailing fuel shortage.59 Central Hudson
challenged the order in state court, contending that it violated the
first and fourteenth amendments as they apply to commercial
speech 0 Nevertheless, the order was upheld by the trial court, the
intermediate appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals. 6 1
However, the Supreme Court reversed. 2
Noting in its opinion that the Constitution affords "a lesser pro-
tection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guar-
anteed expression," the Court pointed out that "[t]he protection
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature
both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by
its regulation. ' 63 Next, the Court set forth a "four part analysis"
developed from its commercial speech decisions: 4
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
54. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. 557.
55. For a discussion of another significant commercial speech case that did not involve attorney
advertising, see Wallace & McKelvey, supra note 10, at 766.
56. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
57. See Shapero, 108 S. Ct. 1916; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
58. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 558.
59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 560.
61. Id. at 561.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 563.
64. Id. at 566.
[Vol. 91
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swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest. 6'
The Court found that the governmental interest asserted by the Pub-
lic Service Commission was substantial, i.e., energy conservation.
However, the regulation advancing the interest was more extensive
than necessary and therefore did not pass the four prong test.66
The Central Hudson test was applied two years later in the at-
torney advertising case of In re R.M.J.67 That case concerned a
Missouri attorney who had advertised in the yellow pages and local
newspapers and had sent out announcement cards to a general mail-
ing list.68 Afterwards, the State Advisory Committee69 filed a com-
plaint in the Supreme Court of Missouri charging the attorney with
unprofessional conduct. Interestingly, in keeping with the Bates de-
cision, the Committee on Professional Ethi6s and Responsibility of
the Supreme Court of Missouri had revised its restrictions on at-
torney advertising with the hope of striking "a midpoint between
prohibition and unlimited advertising." 70 Lawyer advertising would
be permitted, but only certain categories and language would be
allowed. 71 Furthermore, professional announcement cards were al-
lowed but could only be distributed to lawyers, clients, former cli-
ents, personal friends and relatives. 72 The Missouri Supreme Court
rejected the attorney's contention that the restrictions were in vi-
olation of the first and fourteenth amendments as applied to com-
mercial speech and issued a private reprimand.73 The case was then
argued before the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the
judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court.74 After recounting its rea-
soning and holding in Bates,75 the Supreme Court applied the Central
65. Id.
66. Id. at 572.
67. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
68. Id. at 196.
69. Id. at 194 n.5.
70. Id. at 193.
71. Id. at 195 n.6.
72. Id. at 196.
73. Id. at 198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 199-203.
1989]
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Hudson76 test and concluded that none of the restrictions on attorney
advertising met the four-part analysis set forth in Central Hudson.77
In May 1985, the Court handed down a decision which was
claimed by some commentators to be the final prescription as to
attorney advertising. 78 In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,79
the appellant was an Ohio attorney who placed an ad in the local
newspaper which informed readers that his firm would represent
them in drunk driving cases, and if convicted, they would be given
a full refund of their legal fee.80 The attorney removed the ad two
days later after the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio telephoned a warning that "the advertisement ap-
peared to be an offer to represent criminal defendants on a con-
tingent-fee basis. ' 8' The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibited such advertisements. 82 A few -months later, the attorney
ran yet another ad which contained a drawing of a contraceptive
device known as the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD).83 The
ad then proceeded to describe alleged problems caused by the IUD
and to offer legal advice to the reader. Lastly, the ad advised the
reader that the firm was currently representing women in suits con-
cerning the IUD on a contingent fee basis.84 Subsequently, the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel "filed a complaint against [the attorney]
charging him with a number of disciplinary violations arising out
of" the two advertisements. 8
In addition to allegations concerning the drunk driving ad men-
tioned above, the complaint also alleged that the IUD ad violated
DR2-101(B), which prohibited the use of illustrations in advertise-
ments. 86 Furthermore, the complaint charged that the ads were in
76. Id. at 203.
77. Id. at 207.
78. Whitman & Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts of Lawyer Advertising: The Supreme Court's
Latest Clarification, 19 IND. L. Ray. 497 (1986).
79. Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626.
80. Id. at 629.
81. Id. at 630.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 631.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 632 n.4.
[Vol. 91
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violation of two other rules. One prohibited the attorney from ac-
cepting employment from laymen to whom he had given unsolicited
advice.8 7 The other required a disclaimer regarding court costs in
any advertisement mentioning contingent fee rates. 88
The charges were heard before a panel of the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of
Ohio which "rejected [the] appellant's constitutional defenses." 8 9
Subsequently, the panel's findings were adopted by the Board of
Commissioners and then by the Ohio Supreme Court. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.90
After recapping its decisions in Bates, Ohralik, Central Hudson
and In re R.M.J., the Court once again applied the Central Hudson
test to determine if the state of Ohio could indeed regulate Mr.
Zauderer's advertising as it proposed. 91 The Court held that the ad-
vertisement describing the terms of representation in drunk driving
cases and the lack of complete information with regard to contingent
fees could be regulated by the state on the premise that the public
could be misled or otherwise deceived. However, the use of non-
deceptive illustrations and the offer of legal advice were entitled to
constitutional protection and therefore could not be suppressed by
the state. 92
III. SHAPERO V. KENTUCKY BAR AssocIATioN: "A STEP Too
FAR) '
The Supreme Court's latest addition to its attorney advertising
decisions is Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association.93 The case in-
volved a Kentucky attorney who sought approval of a letter he pro-
posed to send to targeted potential clients. 94 The letter read as follows:
87. Id. at 633.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 635.
90. Id. at 635-36.
91. Id. at 655-56.
92. Id. at 639-56.
93. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. 1916.
94. Id. at 1919.
1989]
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It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this
is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep
your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time
to pay them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE
information on how you can keep your home. I
Call NOW don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for
you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there
is NO charge for calling.9'
Shapero applied to the Kentucky Attorneys' Advertising Com-
mission for approval of the letter.9 6 At the time, an existing Ken-
tucky Supreme Court rule prohibited the mailing of written
advertisements " 'precipitated by a specific event or occurrence in-
volving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from
the general public.' ,,97 Even though the Commission did not find
it deceptive or misleading, it could not approve the letter as it clearly
violated a then existing rule. However, the Commission, relying spe-
cifically on the Zauderer decision, recommended that the rule be
revised as it determined that therule itself violated the first amend-
ment. 98 Next, at the suggestion of the Commission, Shapero sought
an advisory opinion as to the rule's validity from the Ethics Com-
mittee of the Kentucky Bar Association.9
The Ethics Committee found the letter neither deceptive nor mis-
leading. However, it felt compelled to uphold the rule.10" The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court reviewed the advisory opinion and consequently
replaced the rule with the ABA's Rule 7.3:101
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in
person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term 'solicit' includes contact in person, by telephone
or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to
a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars
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provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they
might in general find such services useful.102
The new rule prohibited targeted, direct-mail solicitation by law-
yers for pecuniary gain and, consequently, the court did not approve
Shapero's letter. 03 Clearly, the Kentucky Supreme Court was at-
tempting to exercise the prerogative granted it by the Supreme
Court-regulating attorney advertising while keeping within the nec-
essary boundaries that had been mapped out for the states. 1°4 Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Kentucky
court'05 and, in this author's opinion, went a step too far.
The Court began its reasoning by simply restating the principle
that commercial speech which is not misleading or deceptive or does
not promote unlawful transactions enjoys constitutional protection
unless the state can advance a substantial interest in the regulation
thereof. 10 6 The Court then reiterated the Central Hudson test,10 7 not-
ing that, in Zauderer the application of that test resulted in the
striking down of an Ohio rule that prohibited truthful advertising
concerning a specific legal problem for pecuniary gain. 10 8 Moreover,
it distinguished Ohralik, in which pecuniary self interest was the
perceived evil, from Zauderer in that the dangers which were present
in Ohralik were not present in Zauderer.' 9 In other words, even
though the Zauderer ad was for pecuniary gain and was directed
towards a specific group of readers, the ad was placed in a news-
paper for the general population to read or discard as they pleased.
So long as such advertising was truthful and non-deceptive, it de-
served protection. ' 10 The Court thus asserted that the Kentucky court
102. Id., citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 726 S.W.2d at 301 (1987), rev'd, 108 S.
Ct. 1916 (1988). MODEL RutLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT RuLE 7.3 (1984).
103. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
104. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383, where the Court held that states may restrain advertising that
is false or misleading; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460-61, where the Court held that in-person solicitation
for pecuniary gain may be restrained; Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626, where the Court held that general
advertisements containing information about specific legal problems may not be suppressed by the
states.
105. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1925.
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certainly could not prohibit Shapero from sending his letter to the
general population at large with a more general opening line such
as "Is your home being foreclosed on?.""' The Court patronizingly
noted that the Kentucky court obviously appreciated as much." 2
The big surprise in the Court's reasoning in Shapero, however,
is the upholding of targeted mailings such as Shapero's in the name
of efficiency! The Court asserts that Shapero was merely being ef-
ficient in his advertising by wanting to mail the letters solely to those
in need of the particular legal services, as opposed to the general
public. Moreover, "the First Amendment does not permit a ban on
certain speech merely because it is more efficient.""13 If the Court
is so concerned with the efficiency of its brothers at the bar, why
did it not allow Ohralik the same consideration? Nothing could be
more efficient than in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Fur-
thermore, the Court seems to forget that it allowed the targeted
direct-mailing in Primus only because it was not for pecuniary gain.
Therefore, the lawyer's judgment would not be clouded by her own
self-interest. Additionally, the letter in Primus was in furtherance
of associational freedoms.114 The Shapero Court contends that the
dangers of undue influence, overreaching and intimidation do not
exist in the case of targeted mailings as they do in direct solicita-
tion." 5 However, the very qualities that were lacking in Primus and,
therefore, distinguished it from Ohralik, are present in targeted di-
rect mailings: pecuniary self-interest, undue influence and intimi-
dation.
The Court notes that
[a] letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put
in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded. In short, both types
of solicitation . . . 'are more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice
on the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney." 6
111. Id.
112. Id. Rule 7.3 "exempts from the ban 'letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed
generally to persons . . . who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.'
Id.
113. Id.
114. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412.
115. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
116. Id. at 1923 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
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The Kentucky court had asserted that "the potential client may feel
overwhelmed by the basic situation which caused the need for the
specific legal services and may have seriously impaired capacity for
good judgment, sound reason and a natural protective self-interest";
and that "such a condition is full of the possibility of undue in-
fluence, overreaching and intimidation."" 7 In response, the Shapero
court contends that "the potential client will feel equally 'over-
whelmed' by his legal troubles and will have the same 'impaired
capacity for good judgment' regardless of whether a lawyer mails
him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertise-
ment.1118 Certainly, if a potential client receives a targeted letter
quite fortuitously at a time when he is overwhelmed with legal trou-
bles, he will not take the time to "shop around," but instead will
latch on to the first sign of help that comes his way. In fact, Justice
O'Connor in her dissent in Shapero said as much when she asserted
that "[u]nsophisticated citizens, understandably intimidated by the
courts and its officers, may therefore find it much more difficult
to ignore an apparently 'personalized' letter from an attorney than
to ignore a general advertisement. '"" 9 Indeed, one reason for tar-
geted mailings is to take advantage of the potential client's im-
mediate situation. It is as close as an attorney may get to permissible
in-person solicitation, and this author agrees with the Kentucky Court
when it suggests that Shapero is "merely Ohralik in writing."'120 Such
conduct, if allowed, will strip the legal profession of the very dignity
the Court has ostensibly attempted to protect. Attorneys-at-law, if
they are not already, would come to be viewed in the same stereo-
typical light as used car salesmen.
The Supreme Court readily admits that targeted, direct-mail so-
licitation "presents an increased risk of deception, intentional or
inadvertent.'' z2 However, the Court also asserts that "direct-mail
solicitation-'poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influ-
ence' than does in-person solicitation." 22 All advertising carries with
117. Id. at 1922 (citing Shapero, 726 S.W.2d at 301).
118. Id. at 1922.
119. Id. at 1926. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1922.
121. Id. at 1923.
122. Id. at 1922 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
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it some amount of risk of deception and overreaching, which is why
the Court has afforded the states the right to regulate attorney ad-
vertising. It would seem, however, that the question now is how
much risk are the legal profession and the general public expected
to bear?
With respect to regulation, the Court's opinion in Shapero has
placed a greater burden on the states in their efforts to oversee
attorney advertising. At the same time, it has taken away what little
authority remained with the states to preserve the dignity of the
profession. Justice Blackmun's suggestions for regulating targeted
letter mailings123 will work in theory. 124 However, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court appreciated the reality of the situation' 25 as did the
ABA House of Delegates in its comment to Rule 7.3:
State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate specific com-
plaints, much less for those necessary to screen lawyers' mail solicitation material.
Even if they could examine such materials, agency staff members are unlikely to
know anything about the lawyer or about the prospective client's underlying prob-
lem. Without such knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer's re-
presentations are misleading.'1
Justice Blackmun offers a number of options for regulating tar-
geted direct-mailings such as filing the letters with a state agency,
supervising mailings, penalizing abuses, requiring lawyers to prove
the truth of facts stated in letters, and labels identifying letters as
advertisements. The Court further concedes that the state agency or
bar responsible for regulation may have its work cut out for it.127
With respect to such reasoning, Justice O'Connor could not have
been more precise in stating in her dissent that "[tioday's decision-
123. Id. at 1923.
124. Id. at 1926.
125. Id. at 1923. "The court below offered no basis for its 'belie[f] [that] submission of a blank
form letter to the Advertising Commission [does not] provid[e] a suitable protection to the public
from overreaching, intimidation or misleading private targeted mail solicitation.' " Id. (quoting Shap-
ero, 726 S.W.2d at 301).
126. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3
comment (1984)).
127. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924 (1988). Nevertheless, the Court contends such burdens are
justified given that " 'the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing
on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the
misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.' " Id.
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which invalidates a similar rule against targeted, direct-mail adver-
tising-wraps the protective mantle of the Constitution around prac-
tices that have even more potential for abuse. ' 128
IV. CoNcLusIoN
Instead of preserving the dignity and professionalism of the legal
profession, the Supreme Court's latest decision' 29 with respect to
attorney advertising will only serve to corrode those fragile qualities.
In Justice O'Connor's dissent, 130 which has been recognized as strong
and well reasoned,' she posited that the attorney advertising "de-
cisions have radically curtailed the power of the States to forbid
conduct that [she] believe[s] 'promote[s] distrust of lawyers and dis-
respect for our own system of justice.' "132
When Bates was decided eleven years ago, the Supreme Court
came out from "hid[ing] behind issues of dignity and profession-
alism;"'3 and rightly so. Indeed, the court in Bates asserted that it
"suspect[ed] few attorneys engaged in the self-deception . . . [that
they] must conceal from themselves and from their client the real
life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar."' 3 4 Dignified,
non-deceptive, informative advertising which would be regulated by
the States was, it seemed, the Court's vision in Bates. However, as
a result of Shapero, what in 1977 was considered deceptive and
misleading advertising which had serious potential for overreaching,
undue influence and intimidation is now, ironically, constitutionally
protected speech. The Shapero Court concedes that the risk of such
dangers are present in targeted, direct-mail advertising but that such
advertising 'poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influ-
ence' than does in-person solicitation.' 1 35 Apparently it has come
128. Id. at 1926.
129. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. 1916.
130. Id. at 1925.
131. Weston, Advertising? Solicitation? Clearly It's Protected Speech, TBm COMPLEAT LAWYmR
4 (Summer 1988).
132. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1927 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 394 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
133. Weston, supra note 129, at 4.
134. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
135. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
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down to this: How much risk are we willing to take with respect
to the reputation and dignity of the legal profession? Certainly it
matters not the amount of risk the state bar associations deem to
be appropriate or safe. In fact, it has been asserted that "[t]he
tragedy of this case is that the collective bar associations in this
country (including the ABA) abrogated their authority and respon-
sibility to the Supreme Court and now are impotent to effect any
restraints on advertising other than those that are false, misleading,
or deceptive." 3 6
In short, the Shapero Court has done nothing more than license
ambulance chasers to do their chasing through the mail. How long
will it be before they are permitted to do their chasing in person? 3 7
The Court's language in Shapero certainly leads one to believe that
it will not be long until that obstacle is removed. 3 '
Finally, in the words of Justice O'Connor's "well reasoned"
dissent from this judicial "snafu,"
In my judgment, . . . fairly severe constraints on attorney advertising can con-
tinue to play an important role in preserving the legal profession as a genuine
profession. Whatever may be the exactly appropriate scope of these restrictions
at a given time and place, this Court's recent decisions reflect a myopic belief
that 'consumers,' and thus our nation, will benefit from a constitutional theory
that refuses to recognize either the essence of professionalism or its fragile and
necessary foundations. In one way or another, time will uncover the folly of this
approach. I can only hope that the Court will recognize the danger before it is
too late to effect a worthwhile cure. 39
Elizabeth Frasher Pagani
136. Weston, supra note 129, at 4.
137. Id. at 5. "The last remaining obstacle in this area is in-person solicitation, which is still
prohibited." Id.
138. Id.
139. Shapero, at 1931.
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